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ABSTRACT
The risk of securities class action litigation alters corporate savings and investment
policy. Firms with greater exposure to securities litigation hold significantly more cash
in anticipation of future settlements and other related costs. The result is due to firms
accumulating cash in anticipation of lawsuits and not a consequence of plaintiffs targeting firms with high cash levels. The market value of cash is significantly lower for firms
exposed to litigation risk. Corporate investment decisions are also affected by litigation
risk, as firms reduce capital expenditures in response. Our results are robust to endogeneity concerns and possible spurious temporal effects.
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The rights of shareholders, from the basic right to vote to replace directors to the right to
sue for damages in a court of law, are widely recognized as being important for the efficient
allocation of capital through an economy. However, the incentives created by granting strong
legal rights to investors may change firm behavior in unintended ways. In this paper, we investigate how the securities litigation environment in the US affects corporate liquidity policy and
investment decisions. We find that firms significantly alter their cash holdings and investment
policy to manage litigation risk.
Under the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, all publicly listed firms in the United States
are exposed to the risk of security class action lawsuits. Despite the passing of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which intended to make it more difficult to initiate
shareholder lawsuits by requiring plaintiffs to provide proof that executives intentionally defrauded investors, the incidence of securities lawsuit filings has increased (Choi, Nelson, and
Pritchard (2009)) and corporate lawsuit costs have remained high (Karpoff, Lee, and Martin
(2006)). As Zingales (2006) indicates, the total dollar value of lawsuit settlements totaled $9.7
billion in 2005. Given the potential size of lawsuit settlements, litigation risk has important
implications for expected cash flows.
Exposure to securities litigation risk affect firms in various ways, both directly and indirectly. Firms at higher risk of litigation underprice their IPOs relatively more as a form of insurance (Lowry and Shu (2002)) and are more likely to undertake aggressive growth through
acquisitions (Gormley and Matsa (2009)). Litigation risk affects firms’ disclosure behavior
(Skinner (1994)). Auditors shy away from corporate clients at risk of litigation and charge
higher fees (Shu (2000)).
One corporate policy that may be particularly sensitive to litigation risk is the decision to
accumulate cash flow in the form of liquid assets. Bolton, Chen and Wang (2011) present
a dynamic model of investment, financing and risk management in which the firm uses both
a state-noncontingent vehicle (cash) and state-contingent contracts to manage exposure to
systematic and idiosyncratic risk. In their model, financial hedging and liquidity management
are complementary tools in risk management. When dynamic hedging has high transactions
costs, the firm relies more on increasing cash and scaling back investment for hedging risk.
Similarly, Froot and Stein (1998) model a firm’s risk management choices in a world in which
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some risks cannot be perfectly hedged in the capital market. In this framework, firms face a
trade-off between managing risk by entering hedging transactions and managing risk through
capital structure choices. If it is difficult or costly to hedge a particular type of risk, firms will
instead adopt a more conservative capital structure by accumulating a cash buffer.
We hypothesize that litigation risk is an important determinant of a firm’s decision to hold
cash. Due to the costs associated with raising external finance and the possibility of future
cash flow shocks, firms have an incentive to save more cash to avoid raising external capital to
finance new investments and other corporate activities (Lins, Servaes, Tufano (2010)). Thus,
we expect that, all else equal, firms with higher exposure to litigation risk will hold more
cash on their balance sheets in anticipation of future settlement costs and other indirect costs
associated with litigation. We also examine whether the accumulation of cash due to litigation
risk exposure has an impact on firms’ real investment decisions.
Consistent with Bolton, Chen and Wang (2011), in addition to accumulating cash, firms
enter into state-contingent insurance contracts to protect themselves from the direct costs of
litigation risk. Almost all public firms in the U.S. buy A-side or B-side insurance to indemnify
officers or directors.1 Many firms buy also optional entity securities coverage (C-side insurance). Such coverage provides protection for the corporation for its own liability. However,
litigation insurance does not provide full coverage in many cases. According to the annual
Towers Perrin Directors and Officers Liability Surveys, public firms have an average litigation
insurance limit of about $15 million over our sample period (1996-2006). The average settlement amount in our sample is more than three times larger ($56 million) than the average
litigation insurance limit.2 However, the distribution of settlement amounts is highly skewed
due to several very large payouts in our sample. The median settlement amount is $6.5 million. Even though according to Towers Perrin about 85% of public firms in the U.S. bought
some C-side insurance in 2006, only about 50% firms had C-side coverage at the beginning
of our sample period. Additionally, insurance cannot offer protection from the indirect costs
of litigation. Based on settlements costs, the percentage of US firms buying C-side insurance,
1 A-Side

coverage provides coverage directly to the directors and officers for loss resulting from claims made
against them for their wrongful acts. A-Side Coverage applies in cases when the corporation does not indemnify
its directors and officers. B-side coverage reimburses a corporation for its loss if the firm indemnifies its directors
and officers for claims against them.
2 The actual total litigation cost for the average firm is larger when accounting for legal fees.
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and the average annual litigation insurance limit, the aggregate net-of-insurance settlement
cash outflows for US publicly-traded firms in our sample is approximately 2.2 billion dollars
per year during our sample period. Based on annual insurance data in the Towers Perrin surveys and our firm-level settlement data we estimate that about 52% of the firms in our sample
among those that agreed to settle had to pay some out-of-pocket settlement costs.
There are several empirical challenges associated with estimating a relation between litigation risk and corporate policy. The first is that of an omitted variable bias. It is possible that
an unobservable factor may be causing both the initiation of a class action lawsuit and changes
in firm financial policy. A second issue is that of a possible simultaneity bias or reverse causality. Firms may hold higher cash balances because of their exposure to litigation risk, but firms
with higher cash balances may be more likely targets of litigation. As such, we investigate
the impact of litigation risk on corporate cash holdings in both the cross-section and over time
using a variety of approaches. To address the potential for omitted variables bias, we assess
the effect of changes in litigation risk on changes in cash holdings by analyzing the spillover
effects of litigation on industry peer firms not involved in a litigation. This identification
strategy is motivated by the findings of Gande and Lewis (2009) that firm share prices drop
significantly when a peer firm is brought into a class action lawsuit. To deal with potential
simultaneity bias, we employ a simultaneous equations framework, similar to the analysis of
Lowry and Shu (2002) and Field, Lowry, and Shu (2005). Regardless of the approach we use
to estimate litigation risk, our results consistently show a significant positive relation between
litigation risk and cash holdings. After accounting for endogeneity, our results show that firms
preemptively accumulate cash before possible lawsuits rather than plaintiffs targeting firms
with high pre-litigation levels of cash.
In addition to class action securities lawsuits, firms are exposed to other legal risks, such
as copyright infringement, product liability, and antitrust lawsuits. As with other papers examining litigation risk, we choose to focus on securities class action lawsuits. This choice is
motivated by several reasons. First, class action securities fraud litigations are brought under
the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934. As such, all publicly traded firms are susceptible to this
particular type of lawsuit. Second, detailed information related to the class action lawsuits
is publicly available for a longer period than other types of lawsuits, and provides us with
a large observable sample of litigation events. Finally, class action securities litigation is of
3

interest because the average settlement or penalty amounts tend to be quite large and therefore
represents a significant source of loss from the firm’s perspective. In our sample of lawsuits,
the average settlement amount is $56.4 million, which corresponds to more than the level of
cash holdings of the sued firms that settle. Moreover, the statistical distribution of settlement
amounts is characterized by considerable positive skewness. A few settlements surpass the
$1 billion mark, and the largest settlement in our sample amounts to $3.2 billion. In addition
to the direct costs of litigation represented by settlement costs and attorneys fees, sued firms
face several indirect costs (Engelmann and Cornell (1988)). Even though indirect costs are
difficult to measure, they are significant in most cases. When a firm becomes a defendant in
a lawsuit, the cost of implicit and explicit contracts rises. Major lawsuits can also damage
the defendant’s reputation and can negatively affect its relationship with suppliers and customers (Engelmann and Cornell (1988)). One potential concern with our sample of events is
that securities litigation may be more sensitive to changes in firm performance compared to
other types of litigation. While we do control for changes in performance in our analysis, we
also investigate other litigations that are not related to securities law from the Audit Analytics
litigation database. The results from the sample of non-securities litigation events are similar
to our main results, suggesting that the effects of litigation risk are not limited to class action
securities litigation.
We start our empirical investigation by examining whether changes in litigation risk lead
to changes in cash holdings for firms directly involved in securities litigation. We do so by
examining the impact of actual class action lawsuits filed on US firms between 1996 and
2006. We find that, controlling for changing firm characteristics, cash holdings of these firms
increase by an average of 15.5% relative to pre-litigation levels. The results are robust to
different specifications and the inclusion of firm and year fixed effects.
One important concern related to the link between cash holdings and litigation risk is
the potential endogeneity between the choice of how much cash to hold and the decision of
shareholders to file litigation. To identify the causal effects of litigation risk, we examine the
spillover effects of class action litigation on peer firms. Gande and Lewis (2009) demonstrate
that the share prices of firms that are not brought into a legal dispute adjust downward significantly on the announcement of a lawsuit filing of a firm in the same industry. They also show
that litigation concentration in a particular in industry is a strong predictor of actual litigation
4

events. Thus, we treat litigation events on peer firms as an exogenous source of variation in litigation risk for firms in the same industry. We find that peer firms increase their cash holdings
significantly when industry peers are involved in litigation. Specifically, the conditional mean
cash-to-assets ratio for peer firms increases by 10.2% relative to pre-litigation levels following
a litigation event in their industry.
In addition to the spillover effects analysis, we also deal with the potential simultaneity
problem by estimating a system of simultaneous equations that allows us to decompose the
impact of litigation risk on cash holdings (the precautionary savings motive) and the impact
of cash holdings on litigation risk (the enticement effect). The approach we employ is similar
to that adopted by Lowry and Shu (2002), who examine the impact of litigation risk on IPO
underpricing. The results of this system of simultaneous equations dispel concerns of reverse
causality. The evidence from the simultaneous equations suggests that firms accumulate cash
in anticipation of a possible lawsuit. The estimates do not support the conjecture of firms with
larger amounts of cash being more exposed to predatory class action lawsuits.
We then examine corporate investment policy around litigation events. We find a significant reduction in capital expenditures for firms involved in litigation, controlling for Tobin’s
Q and cash flow. We also find evidence of litigation spillover effects in corporate investment. Specifically, we find that firms reduce their capital expenditures when they see some of
their competitors being sued. The spillover effect is economically and statistically significant,
though smaller in magnitude compared to the firms that are directly involved in the lawsuit.
Having established that firms increase their cash holdings in the face of increased litigation
risk, a natural question is whether this accumulation of cash has an impact on firm value.
Given that a successful lawsuit from the plaintiff’s perspective will lead to a net payout of
cash to the litigation claimants that in many instances are not current shareholders of the firm,
we expect that the value of the marginal accumulated dollar of cash will be lower for firms
exposed to litigation risk. Using the methodology of Faulkender and Wang (2006), we find
that the risk of litigation decreases a firm’s marginal value of cash. Our finding that the value
of an additional dollar of cash is significantly lower for firms exposed to litigation risk is also
consistent with Gormley and Matsa (2009), who argue that shareholders of firms exposed to
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litigation risk would prefer to receive higher payouts because excess cash might potentially
increase damage awards.
Overall, our results on the relation between litigation risk and cash holdings are robust to
different proxies of litigation risk, endogeneity concerns, an extensive set of firm characteristics that previous studies have shown to be related to cash holdings levels (e.g., Kim, Mauer
,and Sherman (1998); Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999); Mikkelson and Partch
(2003)), corporate governance characteristics (Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008), Dittmar
and Mahrt-Smith (2007)), unionization rates (Klasa, Maxwell, Ortiz-Molina (2009)), the inclusion of other risk proxies, different empirical specifications, different measures of cash
holdings, and concerns about possible spurious effects due to temporal trends. Our results
also hold when we include all types of corporate lawsuits in our analysis.
Our paper makes two primary contributions. First, we contribute to the literature on the
effects of securities litigation risk on firm behavior and corporate disclosure and financial decisions. Litigation risk of various types is related to IPO underpricing (Lowry and Shu (2002)),
financial reporting and accounting disclosure (Skinner (1994, 1997), Field, Lowry, and Shu
(2005)), leverage (Crane (2011)), institutional monitoring (Cheng et al. (2010)), MD&A disclosures(Brown and Tucker(2011)), audit fees(Seetharaman, Gul, and Lynn (2002)),and executive pay (Peng and Roell (2007)). Gormley and Matsa (2009) investigate firm responses to
liability risk arising from its workers’ exposure to newly identified carcinogens, finding that
firms respond to that type of litigation risk by engaging in diversifying acquisitions. We extend
this stream of research by investigating the link between securities litigation risk, cash holdings, and corporate investment policy, providing another avenue whereby legal institutions
affect corporate behavior. Second, we identify a new determinant of cash holdings and provide evidence that litigation risk has a significant effect on corporate liquidity and investment
policy, supporting the view that the precautionary savings motive is particularly important.
This paper identifies a clear channel whereby precautionary savings operates and contributes
to cash holdings and depress investments. Our results also offer an insight into how firms manage risk in an integrated framework by both entering into insurance contracts and adjusting the
firm’s financial structure to hedge litigation risk.
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The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section I summarizes and describes our
sample of firms and litigation events. Section II presents our primary empirical results. Section III discusses our robustness tests. Finally, Section IV offers a summary and conclusions.

I. Data
A. Sample
Our initial sample consists of the entire population of Compustat firms from 1996 to 2006
with no missing data for the main variables used in the analysis. We then match our sample with the CRSP database and exclude firms that CRSP does not cover. After this match
our sample contains 84,078 firm-year observations. We then match this sample with Execucomp and First Call to obtain variables required by some of our multivariate tests. After this
match our sample consists of 13,589 observations. We then identify a sample of firms subject
to class action lawsuits by collecting litigation data from the Securities Class Action Clearinghouse website (http://securities.stanford.edu/) from 1996 to 2006. We collect information
about lawsuit filing dates, beginning and ending of each class period, type of resolution and
settlement amounts when available. We identify 1,397 sample firms as being involved in security class action lawsuits during our sample period. Definitions for the variables used in this
study are included in the Appendix.
We also collect information about corporate litigations other than security class action
lawsuits from the Audit Analytics Litigation database. The data coverage begins in 2000
and reports information on lawsuits for U.S. publicly-traded firms. Audit Analytics collects
information from corporate disclosures, corporate newswires, and from legal disclosures, registrations and legal opinions filed with the SEC. Audit Analytics reports details related to the
specific litigation, including the type of lawsuits, the original date of filing, and if available,
the settlement amount. Our sample of non-security lawsuits obtained from Audit Analytics
spans from 2000 to 2006 and consists of 4,396 firm-year observations (firms that were sued at
least once in a given fiscal year). The most common types of corporate lawsuits are product
liability, copyright, patent, antitrust, and trade regulation lawsuits.
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B. Matching procedure
The simultaneous equation analysis we discuss in Section II is confined to the analysis of
those firms that are directly involved in a class action lawsuits during the sample period along
with a matching sample of non-litigation firms matched on past profitability, market-to-book
and industry. The matching sample consists of 1,397 litigation firms and 1,397 control firms
for a total of 2,794 firm observations. To match our sample of firms involved in a class action
lawsuit with comparable firms not involved in a litigation we use the Lie (2001) modification
of the Barber and Lyon (1996) method in which companies are matched by industry affiliation, profitability, change in profitability and market-to-book3. We select matching firms that
have the same industry classification of the sample firms and are similar in level of operating
performance in the year preceding the start of the lawsuit (year -1), change in performance
from year -2 to year -1, and market-to-book ratio in year -1. In the first step of our matching
procedure we identify firms (a) with the same two-digit SIC code of the sample firms, (b) with
a level of operating performance between 80 percent and 120 percent of the sample firm’s
level in year -1, (c) with a change in operating performance between 80 and 120 percent of
the sample firm’s change between year -2 and year -1, and (d) with a market-to-book ratio
between 80 and 120 percent of the sample firm’s ratio in year -1.
If more than one firm meets the matching criteria for a single sample firm, we choose the
one that minimize the following metric:
|OPS − OPM | + |∆OPS − ∆OPM | + |MBS − MBM |(1),
where OPS and OPM are the level operating performance in year -1 for the sample and matching firm, ∆OPS and ∆OPM are the changes in operating performance between year -2 and
year -1, and MBS and MBM are the market-to-book ratios in year -1. If we cannot find any
firm satisfying condition (b), we look for firms with a level of operating performance within
±0.01 of the level of the sample firm. We apply the same strategy for the change in operating
performance or the market-to-book ratio if we do not find any firm satisfying condition (c)
3 An

alternative match by industry, market-to-book, and size instead of profitability generates a sample that
produces comparable regression results to the one presented in the paper.
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or condition (d)4 . If we do not find any firm that meets these criteria we repeat the process
looking at firms with the same 1-digit SIC code. If this search is unsuccessful, we match the
firm independently from the SIC code. If we still do not find a valid match, we select the firm
that minimizes formula (1) independently from our filters.

C. Descriptive Statistics
Table I presents the distribution of litigation firms by year and industry. The year with the
largest amount of lawsuit filings in our sample is 2001. Out of the 319 lawsuits initiated that
year, 199 (68.8%) involve firms in the communications, computers and electronics industry
(SIC = 3570-3579, 3600-3699, 4800-4899, 7370-7379). The very large number of lawsuits
for this industry in 2001 is likely due to the burst of the internet bubble that characterized the
US stock market during that period.
Table II presents descriptive statistics on the resolution of the lawsuits involving our sample firms. Of the 1,128 (81%) cases that reached a resolution by the end of 2009, the majority
(613) settled. Panel A of Table II shows that when the plaintiffs receive compensation, it is
always through settlement. The descriptive statistics of settlement amounts presented in Panel
B of Table II show that in many circumstances the monetary awards negotiated through settlements are considerably high. The mean settlement award in our sample is $56.4 million
- an amount larger than the average level of cash held by the sued firm at the year of filing.
Even when we include dismissed and withdrawn cases in the computation of the settlement
statistics by assigning to those cases an award of $0, the mean settlement award to cash holdings is 59.6%. The largest settlement award amounts to $3.2 billion. These summary statistics
demonstrate that these settlement amounts are by no means trivial. In addition to explicit
settlement costs, firms face other direct costs (e.g., attorneys fees), and several indirect costs
described earlier. Effectively, the total amount of litigation costs is higher than the settlement
costs presented in Table II.
4 For

market-to-book we look for firms with a level of MB within ±0.1 of the level of the sample firm.
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II. Empirical Results
A. Litigation Risk and Cash Holdings
We first examine the impact of litigation events on cash holdings in a univariate setting.
We then explore the relationship between litigation and cash holdings by employing various
multivariate analyses. We begin by analyzing the effect of litigation events on firms that are
directly involved in securities litigation. While these results are suggestive of an effect, they
are subject to possible omitted variables and simultaneity bias. To better assess the causal
link between changes in litigation risk and cash holdings, we examine the effect of a litigation
event for a particular firm on the cash holdings of peer firms that are not involved in litigation
themselves. Since higher cash holdings may increase the probability of a litigation event in
the first place, we then jointly estimate the probability of being brought into litigation and the
effect of litigation on the firm’s cash holdings. We also investigate the value implications of
increased cash holdings brought on by changes in litigation risk. We then analyze the effect
of litigation risk on corporate investments.

B. Univariate Analysis
Table III reports summary statistics for the cash holdings of US firms involved in litigations over the period 1996 to 2006. We report summary statistics in event time, where year
zero represents the year of the litigation filing. We calculate means and quartiles of the cash
distribution for the two years prior and the two years following the litigation event. The mean
cash to total assets ratio in the year prior to the litigation filing is 0.223. Cash holdings jump
significantly in the year of the litigation, rising 17.5% relative to the pre-litigation level to
0.268. The increase in cash holdings appears to be persistent, remaining higher at nearly 25%
of total assets two years after the filing. Panel B confirms that this increase is statistically significant for both the year of the litigation and the two-year period immediately following the
lawsuit. The mean difference between the litigation year and the two prior years is 0.039 with a
t-statistic of 3.545. The mean difference between the post-litigation period (years 1 and 2) and
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the pre-litigation period (years -2 and -1) is also statistically significant, with post-litigation
holdings averaging 0.025 higher than pre-litigation years.
To check that the mean increase is not driven by a few outliers, we also summarize changes
in the distribution of cash holdings in event time. Panel A reports the first quartile, median,
and third quartile of the cash holdings distribution for firms involved in litigation. The entire
distribution of cash holdings for the sample firms shifts upwards. The first quartile increases
from 0.029 to 0.046 in the litigation year, while the median and third quartile increase from
0.130 to 0.185 and 0.369 to 0.490, respectively.
The firm’s involved in litigation in our sample have slightly higher cash holdings even
before the litigation event. Two years before litigation, firms in the sample have a mean
cash-to-assets ratio of 0.224, compared with 0.191 for the overall Compustat sample. Firms
are possibly anticipating the incidence of a lawsuit and begin accumulating additional cash.
Alternatively, firms with higher cash holdings might be more likely to be targeted for litigation
in the first place. In our multivariate analysis we revisit this possibility by investigating this
possible reverse causality between cash holdings and litigation risk.

C. Effects of Litigation on the Cash Holdings of Sued Firms
The univariate results suggest that firms involved in litigation increase their cash holdings.
We now turn to a multivariate approach to control for changing firm characteristics and time
trends that may also affect changes in cash holdings. We estimate several specifications of cash
regressions in which we include a series of event dummy variables to capture the changes in
cash holdings following a litigation event. The specification of the cash holdings regression
is similar to that of Opler et. al (1999) and Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), who identify potential determinants of cash holdings, both in the cross-section and over time. The dependent
variable in the regressions is defined as cash and short-term investments scaled by net-of-cash
total assets. As control variables, we include firm size, leverage, cash flow, net working capital,
dividend paying status, market-to-book ratio, capital expenditures, acquisition expenditures,
R&D to sales ratio, net debt and equity issuance, and cash flow volatility. The specific definitions of these variables are included in the appendix. We include four litigation event dummy
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variables, Lk , for k = 0, 1, 2, 3 where year zero is the litigation initiation year. The timing of
the dummy variables is set to capture the duration of actual litigation events. Klausner and
Hegland (2010) find that the average time from class action filing to settlement is close to two
years. We also include firm, industry, and year fixed effects in various specifications.
Table IV reports the estimates from the cash holdings regressions. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level in all specifications. The first specification is estimated via ordinary
least squares without industry and time effects. The second specification adds time effects in
the form of calendar year dummies. The third and fourth specifications include industry fixed
effects, with the fourth specification including both industry and year dummies. The magnitude and signs of the coefficients of the control variables are consistent with previous research.
The coefficients on the litigation event dummies are positive and statistically significant across
all specifications, suggesting that firms increase their cash holdings significantly following a
litigation event. Cash holdings increase following the litigation and stay high for the two
years following the litigation and then start to drop in the third year, consistent with the average duration of litigation events reported by Klausner and Hegland (2010). The fixed-effects
estimates suggest that firms increase their cash holdings above their pre-litigation levels by
almost 4.5% of total assets. In economic terms, this translates into a relative increase of about
15.3% relative to pre-litigation levels. To control for time-variant unobservable variation, the
fifth specification includes both firm and year fixed effects. This specification captures the
within-firm variation in cash holdings around a litigation event. The coefficient of the litigation dummy is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that firms change their cash
holdings in response to litigation.
Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009) indicate that cash holdings in the United States have a significant temporal trend. They find in their sample that average cash holdings increase by 129%
between 1980 and 2004. While we control for various measures of time-varying firm risk and
calendar year dummies, there is still some concern that our results might be coming from nonlinear temporal trends in the data. To address this concern, we re-estimate the cash holdings
regressions over the sample period using random ’placebo’ dummy variables. To do this, we
randomly select firm-year observations each year to serve as a random event. We sample with
replacement from the overall Compustat sample each year. The sample size is selected such
that the relative frequency of random events each year matches the relative frequency of actual
12

litigation events as reported in Table I. For each firm-year randomly selected, we create the
set of dummy variables described above where year zero is the year of selection. After the
random selection, we end up with a series of dummy variables that looks like the litigation
event variables in the previous regressions, except that the timing is randomly allocated across
the panel. Thus, if a temporal trend were driving the results in the earlier specifications, we
would expect a significantly positive coefficient on the random placebo variable. Specification
(6) of Table IV reports the estimates of this random placebo test. All of the estimates on the
control variables are similar as in the other specifications. The coefficients on the placebo
dummy variables are insignificant, suggesting that the effects in the other regressions are systematically related to litigation events and not to temporal trends in the sample.
While consistent with the hypothesis that the risk of securities litigation leads firms to
hold more cash, the results in Table IV may be driven by an omitted variable that drives
both changes in cash and a litigation event. In the next section, we address this concern
by employing industry spillover effects to identify a cleaner link between litigation risk and
changes in cash holdings.

D. Spillover Effects
The fundamental question we wish to address in this paper is whether litigation risk leads
firms to hold more cash. While we have demonstrated robust evidence consistent with this
hypothesis, establishing a causal link is challenging. Litigation risk is inherently unobservable
and difficult to measure. In order to assess the causal link between litigation risk and cash
holdings, we examine the spillover effects on other firms that are not actually involved in
litigation. The existence of spillover effects around litigation events suggest that firms update
their subjective probability of being brought into litigation when a peer firm has a case filed
against it. Gande and Lewis (2009) find strong evidence of spillover effects in litigation.
They find that lawsuits in a given industry signal an increased possibility that other firms in
the same industry may be sued as well. In particular, they find that peer firms have negative
stock price reactions to the announcement of litigation events for peer firms. In addition,
Kim and Skinner (2012) find that industry membership is not a particularly good predictor of
firm-level litigation events unless the specification used to predict events also contains firm13

specific variables. It is reasonable then to assume that an actual lawsuit within an industry is a
good proxy for changes in litigation risk for other firms in the same industry. Employing the
spillover proxy addresses the concerns about potential endogeneity as it is unlikely that the
characteristics of a firm not involved in litigation are driving the lawsuits of other firms.
We first estimate spillover effects in the panel of firms in our sample. We set the industry
litigation dummy variable to one for a given firm year if another firm in the same four-digit
SIC industry has had a class action lawsuit filed against it in the same year. Firms that are
actually involved in litigation events are dropped from the sample.5 We then estimate the cash
holdings regression including firm and year fixed effects. The results are reported in the first
column of Table V. The coefficient on the industry litigation dummy variable is positive and
statistically significant, suggesting that exogenous changes in litigation risk exposure lead to
higher cash holdings.
We also estimate the time-series effect of litigation on peer firms by constructing industrylevel observations based on firms that have not yet been involved in a litigation event. For
every 4-digit SIC industry each year, we include all firms that have not had any lawsuits filed
against them prior to that year. If at any time a firm in an industry becomes involved in
litigation, that firm is removed from the sample and we set an event dummy variable equal to
one for that industry. We use this dummy variable to measure the impact of the litigation on
the other, non-sued firms in the industry. The industry characteristics (cash holdings, leverage,
etc.) are measured in two ways. In the first approach, we equal-weight each firm in the
industry, so that a particular characteristic is the average of the firm characteristics of all
firms in that particular industry in a given year. In the second approach, we value-weight
the observations by summing up the numerators of the firm ratios and dividing them by the
sum of the denominators. For example, the industry cash holdings variable for industry k in
year t would be
Nk

∑ Cashit

Cashkt =

i=1
Nk

,

∑ Assetsit

i=1

5 We have repeated the analysis with the sued firms included in the regression and the results are similar. The
results are available upon request.
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where Nk is the number of firms in industry k. We also control for industry performance
measured by industry-level stock returns, cash flow, and cash flow volatility to address the
possibility that poor industry performance is driving both the litigation events and the observed
spillover effects.
Table V reports the results of the industry cash regressions. Column 2 reports the results from the equal-weighted industry observations, while column 3 reports the results for
the value-weighted observations. The unconditional mean cash-to-assets ratio for the industry portfolios is 0.130 for the equal-weighted observations and 0.100 for the value-weighted
observations. Table V demonstrates that litigation has an effect on the cash holdings of peer
firms in the same industry. Across all specifications, the coefficient on the industry litigation
dummy is positive and statistically significant. The results are also economically significant.
The estimates imply that industry cash holdings for the firms that are not involved in the litigation increases by 10.2% relative to the unconditional average in the equal-weighted case
and a 15% increase in the value-weighted case, suggesting that an exogenous change in the
probability of a future lawsuit leads firms to increase their cash holdings.
One potential concern with the industry-level regressions is that a large proportion of litigations in our sample were against technology firms just following the crash of the internet/technology bubble in 2001. It is possible that the technology firms that survived the crash
increased their cash holdings as a consequence of bad performance and the same time were
brought into litigation. To address this concern, we estimate the industry-level regressions
with the firms in the communications, computers and electronics industries (SIC = 3570-3579,
3600-3699, 4800-4899, 7370-7379) omitted from the sample. The results are reported in the
last column of Table V. The magnitude and size of the coefficient on the industry litigation
event dummy is similar to that of the full sample, suggesting that the results are not driven by
the dynamics of tech firms around the crash of the internet bubble.

E. Joint Estimation of Cash Holdings and Litigation Risk
The results to this point suggest that firms tend to accumulate excess cash as a form of
insurance against future possible litigations. However, as mentioned earlier, higher levels
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of cash holdings might also increase the probability of class action lawsuits. We capture the
interaction between these two effects and control for the possible endogenous relation between
litigation risk and cash holdings by adopting the approach used by Lowry and Shu(2002) and
Field, Lowry, and Shu (2005). For this analysis we use the Lowry and Shu(2002) ex ante
proxy for litigation risk by assigning the value of one to a litigation risk dummy for the firms
that are involved in a litigation in the following year, and zero otherwise.
We use the following system of equations:

Insurance Effect : Cash Ratio = γ1 Litigation + θ1 X + β1 X1 + ε1 ,

(1)

Enticement Effect : Litigation = γ2 Cash Ratio + θ2 X + β2 X2 + ε2 ,

(2)

where Cash Ratio is the ratio of cash and marketable securities to the book value of total
assets for firm i; Litigation is the litigation risk for firm i, as described above; X is a vector of
control variables, exogenous firm characteristics that are common to both equations because
potentially related both to the cash ratio and to litigation risk; X1 is the identifying variable of
the first equation, an exogenous firm characteristic that is uniquely related to the cash ratio, but
not to litigation risk; and X2 is the identifying variable of the second equation, an exogenous
variable that is directly related to the probability of a lawsuit but not to the cash ratio.
As identifying variable X1 we use firm leverage. The negative significant relation between
leverage and the cash ratio is well established in the finance literature (e.g., Opler et al. (1999)
and Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2007)). However studies of litigation risk determinants do not
find a significant relation between leverage and litigation risk (e.g., Cao and Narayanamoorthy
(2006)). As identifying variable X2 we use stock turnover. Stock turnover is related to plaintiffs’ incentives to initiate lawsuits because settlement amounts are generally increasing in the
number of shares traded at the allegedly misleading prices (Lowry and Shu (2002)). However,
stock turnover is not related to the cash ratio.
Our simultaneous equation analysis uses an indicator variable equal to 1 when a firm is
actually involved in a lawsuit in the following year. The litigation firms are matched with
control firms using the matching procedure described in Section I. The simultaneous equation
model has both a continuous and a dichotomous dependent variable. In order to estimate the
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model and correctly determine the standard errors we apply the two-stage Maddala (1983)
method as in Lowry and Shu (2002). In the first stage, we fit the two models with an OLS
and probit regression respectively, using all the exogenous variables. In the second stage, we
replace the original endogenous variables (cash ratio and litigation) with their respective fitted
values. In this system of equations the exogenous variables refer to the fiscal year preceding
the litigation filing date. Therefore, the regressions generate ex ante estimates of cash holdings
and litigation risk.
Table VI presents the results of the second-stage regressions in which the dependent variables are the cash ratio and the litigation indicator variables respectively6. The table presents
three different specifications. The first specification does not contain unionization rates and
governance variables, the second specification contains the unionization rate variable, and the
third specification contains the governance index and managerial ownership variables.
In all specifications the litigation instrument (fitted value from the first stage) is significantly related to the cash ratio, consistent with firms accumulating cash preceding the filing of
a lawsuit. The cash ratio instrument (fitted value from the first stage) is however not significantly related to litigation risk. Thus, our estimation results do not support the conjecture that
firms with larger amounts of cash are more exposed to predatory class action lawsuits. The
majority of the coefficients of the other variables in the first specification are consistent with
previous literature on cash holdings and litigation risk, suggesting that the significant relation
between litigation risk and cash holdings is not due to the correlation between litigation risk
and other firm characteristics such as firm size or amount of dividend payouts.
In the second specification we control for the potential effect of industry unionization rates
on the level of cash holdings7. While our main results persist, the unionization rate variable in
the cash second-stage regression is not significant. Our results, however, are not at odds with
Klasa, Maxwell, and Ortiz-Molina (2009) because our sample is quite different from theirs.
Our sample is not restricted to manufacturing firms and contains only firms involved in a class
6 The

results of the first-stage regressions are available upon request.
industry unionization rate data that is publicly available at www.unionstats.com is organized by Census
Industry Classification (CIC) industries. Since some general SIC four-digit industries ending with 00 do not
correspond to any specific CIC industry, about 5% of our observations have missing unionization rates when we
merge our Compustat data with unionization data. In order to avoid losing these observations in our regressions
we equal missing unionization rates to 0 and create a “missing unionization” indicator variable equal to 1 when
unionization rates are missing, and 0 otherwise.
7 The
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action lawsuit along with their matches. The difference between our sample and those in
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) might also explain
the lack of significance of the G-Index variable in our third specification.

F. Litigation and Corporate Investments
The results above demonstrate that firms increase their cash holdings in response to changes
in exposure to litigation risk. An important question that arises is whether this behavior has
any effect on real investment. That is, do firms forgo investment in order to save cash due to
the lawsuit? To examine this possibility, we estimate the investment regression
Iit = αi + β1 Litigationit + β2 Qi,t−1 + β3CFi,t−1 + γt + εit ,
where Iit is capital expenditures scaled by beginning-of-year net property, plant and equipment, Qi,t−1 is beginning-of-year Tobin’s Q, and CFi,t−1 is the beginning-of-year cash flow
rate, and Litigationit is set equal to one if the firm is involved in a class action lawsuit in year
t.
The first two columns of Table VII report the results where the litigation dummy is constructed based on the firms actually involved in the litigation. We see that for both specifications, capital expenditures decrease significantly during the class action filing year, consistent
with the view that firms are forgoing investment to accumulate cash. The third column considers litigation spillover effects on corporate investment. Here, we define the litigation dummy
based on the litigation events of peer firms in the same four-digit SIC industry. Thus, the
dummy is set to one for firm i if a firm in the same industry is involved in a class action lawsuit in year t. The results provide evidence of spillover effects in corporate investment. Firms
that are not involved in litigation reduce capital expenditures and save cash when peer firms
are sued. The magnitude is smaller than for the sued firms, but still economically significant.
The coefficient on the litigation dummy in column three implies that firms reduce their investment rates on average by about 4.6% compared to years when no firms in an industry are in
the litigation process.
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One concern related to the investment results is the impact of measurement error in Tobin’s
Q on our estimates. Since the actual Tobin’s Q is unobservable, our proxy may be measured
with error. If the measurement error in our proxy for Tobin’s Q is correlated with the litigation
event dummy variable, then the coefficient of interest may be biased. To address this concern,
we employ the reverse regression bounds approach of Erickson and Whited (2005) in order
to ensure the robustness of the sign of our estimate. We find that that our estimated treatment
effect is robust to this concern because of a relatively low correlation with our proxy for
Q8 . The low correlation implies that any measurement error contained in our litigation event
variable is likely to lead to the usual attenuation bias of the OLS coefficient, suggesting that if
anything, our estimate of the effect of litigation on investment is conservative.

G. The Effect of Litigation Risk on the Market Valuation of Cash Holdings
The evidence offered by our tests thus far presents a consistent picture. Firms that perceive
being significantly exposed to litigation risk tend to accumulate cash in excess over what is
predicted by the determinants established previously by the literature. An important question
is how the market values these changes in cash holdings. In this section we investigate to
what extent cash that is put aside preemptively to cope with the anticipated cost of litigation
contributes to firm value. A large portion of the settlement paid by the defendant firm is
allocated to plaintiff shareholders that are no longer shareholders of the firm at the time of
the settlement. Moreover, legal fees sustained by the defendant firm are often significant. We
expect, therefore, that the changes in cash held by firms at risk of litigation contribute less to
shareholder value than cash of firms with low or no risk of litigation.
We investigate this issue by applying the method introduced by Faulkender and Wang
(2006). We present the results of our analysis on the valuation of cash holdings in Table VIII.
We construct an ex ante measure of exposure to litigation risk as the predicted probability
from a probit model similar to Kim and Skinner (2012)9 . With the exception of the litigation
8 Results
9 The

available upon request.
estimation details and estimates are reported in the Internet Appendix.
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risk variable10 and the unionization rate variables, we construct all the other variables as in
Faulkender and Wang (2006). We measure all variables for the fiscal year preceding the litigation filing. The dependent variable is the firm’s excess stock return calculated as the firm’s
annual stock return minus the annual stock return of the matched Fama and French 5 × 5 size
and book-to-market portfolio. With the exception of the litigation variable, leverage, and the
unionization variables, we scale all other independent variables by the lagged market value of
equity.
The results of all regressions presented in Table VIII show that, consistent with Faulkender and Wang (2006) and Pinkowitz and Williamson (2007), the coefficient of the annual
change in cash holdings is positive and significant. The litigation risk variable is negative and
significant suggesting that, everything else constant, the stock market values significantly less
firms exposed to litigation risk. The coefficient of the interaction between the change in cash
holdings and the litigation risk variable is negative and significant, indicating that the marginal
value of an additional dollar of cash is lower for firms exposed to litigation risk. These findings are consistent with the plaintiff law firms and former shareholders receiving a significant
portion of the cash disbursed by the company. Our result persists also when controlling for the
potential effect of the degree of industry unionization on the value of cash holdings as in Klasa,
Maxwell, and Ortiz-Molina (2009), and the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) governance
index as in Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007).
In order to appreciate the economic significance of the litigation risk on the value of cash,
we calculate the marginal value of a dollar of cash for the average sample firm using the mean
values of the independent variables that interact with the change in cash and their coefficients
in the first specification. We use the mean values of cash holdings divided by market value of
equity and market leverage of 21.5% and 15.2%, respectively. The marginal value of a dollar
of cash for a company with an average predicted probability of litigation (3.6%) is therefore
$0.93 = 1.246 -1.146 * 3.6% - 0.084 * 21.5% - 1.667 * 15.2%. This value is almost identical
to the marginal value of a dollar of cash for the average firm of $0.94 obtained by Faulkender
and Wang (2006). The marginal value of a dollar of cash for a company with a predicted
probability of litigation one standard deviation above the mean (9.6%) is $0.86. The marginal
10 We

have used other measures of litigation risk, including the litigation event dummy variable employed in
the earlier analysis and alternative probit models described in the robustness section
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value of a dollar of cash for a company with a predicted probability of litigation equal to zero
(one standard deviation below the mean would be a negative number) is instead $0.97, that
is $0.11 higher. These results show that the contribution of litigation risk to the firms’ value
of cash is economically significant. Overall, the results presented in Table VIII show that the
negative effect of litigation risk on the incremental value of cash holdings is both statistically
and economically significant.

III. Robustness Checks
In additional robustness tests, we demonstrate that various ex ante measures of litigation
risk are positively and significantly related to cash holdings in the cross-section of US firms,
controlling for all other factors that are known to be correlated with cash. Similar to Kim
and Skinner (2012), we construct ex ante measures of litigation risk by obtaining predicted
probabilities from a series of probit regressions that attempt to explain the probability that a
firm is sued in a given year. The economic effects of litigation risk are significant and quite
large. We find that a one-standard deviation increase in the ex-ante measures of litigation risk
yield expected increases in the conditional mean cash/assets ratio ranging from 5.9% to 6.5%,
depending on the specific measure and model specification11 .
In this section, we conduct various robustness tests related to the cash holdings results
presented above. One possible concern is related to using the ratio of cash to net-of-cash
total assets as our measure of cash holdings. Possible changes in the level of assets before
a lawsuit could significantly change the value of this variable and generate spurious results.
If, for instance, the goodwill impairment following an unsuccessful merger triggered a class
action lawsuit, the cash ratio would be higher pre-litigation due to a decline in assets (the
denominator) instead of an increase in cash (the numerator). To address this concern, we
replicate all our multivariate tests replacing the cash ratio with the natural logarithm of cash
and short-term securities to verify that our results are driven by cash levels and not assets
levels. The coefficient on the litigation dummy is large, positive, and statistically significant,
suggesting that our results are driven by changes in cash levels and not by changes in assets.
11 Estimation

details and results for all of the robustness tests listed in this section are included in the Internet

Appendix

21

Even though class action security lawsuits are the most common type of litigation faced
by U.S. corporations, there exist many other types of lawsuits. As reported in the data section,
we collect information about corporate litigations other than security class action lawsuits
from the Audit Analytics Litigation database. Our sample of non-security lawsuits obtained
from Audit Analytics spans the time period from 2000 to 2006. The most common types
of other corporate lawsuits are product liability, copyright and patent, and antitrust and trade
regulation litigations. These lawsuits are less likely to be triggered by a decline in stock price
performance than are security lawsuits. Therefore, expanding the sample to all lawsuits allows
us to verify that our results are not driven by a possible correlation between a general shortfall
risk and litigation risk 12 . We find a strong, positive relationship between cash holdings and
measures of litigation risk based on these other types of litigation events. The findings suggest
that other types of litigation, not just securities law cases, have a significant effect on corporate
liquidity policy.

IV. Conclusions
In this study we link a major external source of corporate risk, securities class action
litigation risk, with two of the main corporate financial decisions that executives have to make,
the amount of cash to hold on the balance sheet and the level of corporate investments to
sustain firm’s growth. We find that the risk of securities litigation significantly affects the
amount of cash firms choose to hold. Firms at risk of being sued tend to hold significant larger
amounts of cash even after controlling for a comprehensive array of cash determinants and
possible time effects. We also show that firms pre-emptively accumulate cash before possible
lawsuits rather than plaintiffs targeting firms with high levels of cash. The impact of litigation
risk on cash holdings is not limited to firms that are actually sued. We find strong evidence
of spillover effects within industries, suggesting that our results are not due to an omitted
variables bias. That is, when a firm is brought into a class action lawsuit under the Securities
Acts, peer firms in the same industry respond by increasing their holdings as they revise their
perceived exposure to litigation risk upwards.
12 This

is, however, a minor concern because in our main regressions we control for systematic and idiosyncratic risk.
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We find that litigation risk affects corporate investment decisions. Our results suggest
that firms forgo capital expenditures to save cash in response to increases in litigation risk
exposure. This finding suggests that the legal protection available to firms stakeholders can
have the unintended consequence of depressing the level of corporate investments. We also
provide evidence on the impact of litigation risk on the marginal value of cash. A dollar of cash
is worth less for firms at risk of litigation, likely a reflection of the multiplicity of recipients
of class action lawsuit settlements. Even though cash provides insurance against possible
lawsuit settlements costs, because part of the cash disbursed by the defendant firm goes to
the plaintiff law firms and stakeholders that do not currently own shares of the defendant
companies, shareholders appear to value corporate cash less for firms that are expected to be
sued in the near future.
It is well known that firms on average hold significant amounts of cash. Several studies,
beginning with Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999) show that firm characteristics
cannot totally explain the large amount of cash held by firms on average. Our study identifies
a new determinant of corporate cash holdings that is clearly related to the precautionary motive for accumulating large quantities of cash reserves. The results of this paper suggest that
institutions, not just firm characteristics, interact with the costs and benefits of holding liquid
assets. The empirical results also provide an insight into how firms manage risk in general.
Firms appear to deal with litigation risks in an integrated manner, hedging the risk by both entering into limited insurance contracts and holding a larger cash buffer to offset the increased
variability in expected cash flows, as suggested by Bolton, Chen and Wang (2011) and Froot
and Stein (1998).
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Table I

Distribution Litigation Events across Years and Industries
The litigation sample consists of security class action lawsuits filed between 1996 and 2006 in which the defendant is a US corporation with data available on Compustat. Panel A reports the distribution of the sample lawsuits
across years. Panel B reports the distribution of sued firms by various industries. Securities litigation data are
from the Securities Class Action Clearinghouse website (http://securities.stanford.edu/) from 1996 to 2006.
Panel A: Distribution of Lawsuits over Time
Number of Lawsuits
50
81
123
120
110
319
141
124
143
116
70
1,397
Panel B: Distribution of Lawsuits across Industries
Industry
Number of Lawsuits
Agriculture and mining
4
Apparel
24
Communications, computers, and electronics
555
Construction
9
Finance
169
Food
15
Health
37
Manufacturing
175
Oil and Gas
18
Printing and publishing
9
Recreation
15
Science
83
Services
78
Trade
121
Transportation
31
Utilities
33
Other
21
Total
1,397
Year
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Total
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Table II

Lawsuit Resolution Statistics
Panel A presents the outcomes of the lawsuits contained in our security class action litigation sample as of
December 31, 2009. Panel B presents summary statistics related to the settlement amounts for the closed
cases. For the statistics of “all non-pending cases” we assign a settlement amount equal to 0 to dismissed
and withdrawn cases. Securities litigation data are from the Securities Class Action Clearinghouse website
(http://securities.stanford.edu/) from 1996 to 2006.

Settled
Dismissed or withdrawn
Still pending
Total

Panel A: Litigation Outcome
Number of Cases
Percent of Total
613
43.9%
515
36.9%
269
19.3%
1,397
Panel B: Settlement Amount
Mean
Median

25th Percentile
Excluding Dismissed and Withdrawn Cases
Settlement ($ millions)
56.4
6.5
3.0
Settlement / Cash Holdings
114.9%
15.8%
4.1%
All Non-Pending Cases∗
Settlement ($ millions)
29.2
2.3
0.0
Settlement / Cash Holdings
59.6%
4.3%
0.0%
∗ In “all non-pending cases” we assign 0 to the settlement amount for dismissed and withdrawn cases.
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75th Percentile

Maximum

19.3
54.7%

3,200.0
11,526.5%

7.0
27.8%

3,200.0
11,526.5%

Table III

Univariate Statistics: Cash Holdings in Event Time
This table reports the distribution of cash holdings in event time for firms involved in securities litigation. Year
zero is set as the year of the lawsuit initiation. Cash holdings are measured as the ratio of cash and short term
investments to net-of-cash total assets. The sample period is 1996 to 2006.

Event Year
-2
-1
0
1
2
Period
(0) vs (-2, -1)
(1,2) vs (-2,-1)

Panel A: Cash Holdings in Event Time
Mean
Q1
Median
0.224
0.029
0.120
0.223
0.029
0.130
0.262
0.046
0.185
0.249
0.044
0.157
0.248
0.045
0.159
Panel B: Univariate Tests
Mean Difference
SE Diff
t-statistic
0.039
0.011
3.545
0.025
0.009
2.778

29

Q3
0.364
0.369
0.490
0.408
0.401

Std. Dev.
0.241
0.241
0.277
0.245
0.244

Table IV

Class Action Litigation Events and Cash Holdings
This dependent variable in all regressions is the ratio of cash and short-term investments to net-of-cash total
assets. The firm characteristics, described in detail in the appendix, are also scaled by net-of-cash total assets.
The litigation event time dummies, L0 , L1 , L2 , and L3 , are set equal to one in the year relative to the litigation
event, with year zero being the year the litigation was initiated. The dummy variables for the placebo regression in
specification (6) are defined in a similar manner as the litigation event dummies, but the event year is generated by
a simple random sample with replacement among the overall Compustat sample such that the relative frequency
of random events matches the relative frequency of actual litigation initiations each year in the full sample. tstatistics are calculated based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The sample period is 1996 to
2006.

L0
L1
L2
L3
ln(Total Assets)
Leverage
Cash Flow
Net Working Capital
Dividend Payer
Market-to-Book
Capital Expenditures
Acquisitions
R&D to Sales
Net Equity Issuance
Net Debt Issuance
Industry CF Volatility
Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared

(1)
0.060
(3.96)***
0.068
(4.38)***
0.052
(3.39)***
0.030
(1.94)*
-0.006
(3.10)***
-0.272
(15.58)***
0.067
(8.97)***
-0.099
(7.91)***
-0.049
(4.27)***
0.008
(8.57)***
-0.480
(8.12)***
-0.425
(10.92)***
0.075
(8.85)***
0.164
(16.94)***
0.193
(11.41)***
0.521
(4.08)***
50,887
0.38

(2)
0.063
(3.94)***
0.070
(4.22)***
0.053
(3.45)***
0.031
(2.01)**
-0.006
(3.02)***
-0.269
(15.58)***
0.066
(8.39)***
-0.097
(7.93)***
-0.049
(4.25)***
0.008
(8.22)***
-0.480
(8.25)***
-0.432
(10.28)***
0.075
(8.17)***
0.164
(16.31)***
0.189
(10.96)***
0.579
(3.75)***
Year
50,887
0.38

(3)
0.046
(2.82)***
0.054
(3.15)***
0.040
(2.61)**
0.021
(1.37)
-0.005
(2.37)**
-0.234
(15.89)***
0.059
(8.99)***
-0.083
(7.10)***
-0.023
(3.13)***
0.007
(7.65)***
-0.428
(11.64)***
-0.415
(11.10)***
0.059
(10.16)***
0.156
(15.99)***
0.162
(11.91)***
0.082
(1.05)
Industry
50,887
0.43
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(4)
0.045
(2.83)***
0.055
(3.05)***
0.041
(2.67)***
0.022
(1.43)
-0.005
(2.56)**
-0.232
(15.73)***
0.059
(8.74)***
-0.080
(6.98)***
-0.024
(3.13)***
0.007
(7.48)***
-0.418
(11.56)***
-0.415
(10.65)***
0.059
(10.46)***
0.157
(16.03)***
0.160
(11.87)***
0.040
(0.42)
Industry, Year
50,887
0.44

(5)
0.039
(3.29)***
0.035
(2.42)**
0.030
(1.98)**
0.012
(0.78)
-0.018
(6.07)***
-0.134
(14.35)***
0.037
(8.66)***
-0.048
(7.33)***
0.007
(2.42)**
0.004
(6.25)***
-0.319
(15.71)***
-0.280
(19.28)***
0.018
(5.93)***
0.158
(17.36)***
0.127
(12.53)***
-0.025
(0.58)
Firm, Year
50,887
0.48

(6)
-0.004
(0.57)
-0.008
(1.19)
0.000
(0.01)
-0.011
(1.47)
-0.005
(2.56)**
-0.232
(15.95)***
0.058
(8.60)***
-0.081
(6.90)***
-0.025
(3.15)***
0.006
(7.68)***
-0.418
(11.44)***
-0.419
(10.46)***
0.059
(10.85)***
0.155
(15.53)***
0.159
(11.63)***
0.049
(0.52)
Industry, Year
50,887
0.43

Table V

The Effects of Litigation on Peer Firms
This table reports regression estimates from industry cash holdings regressions. Industry membership is based
on 4-digit SIC codes. The firm characteristics, including cash holdings (which we describe in the appendix),
are aggregated at the industry level on both an equal-weighted (EW) and value-weighted (VW) basis each year.
Firms that are involved in actual litigation events are not included in the sample. The litigation dummy is set
equal to one in years when a firm within the same 4-digit SIC industry has a lawsuit initiated against it in that
calendar year. The last column reports the results using the value-weighted industry panel with firms from the
communications, computers and electronics industries (SIC = 3570-3579, 3600-3699, 4800-4899, 7370-7379)
omitted from the sample. The sample period is 1996 to 2006. The reported t-statistics are based on robust
standard errors, clustered at the firm level in the firm-level panel and at the 4-digit SIC industry level for the
aggregated industry panels.

Industry Litigation Event
ln(Total Assets)
Leverage
Cash Flow
Net Working Capital
Dividend Payer
Market-to-Book
Capital Expenditures
Acquisitions
R&D to Sales
Net Debt Issuance
Net Equity Issuance
Industry CF Volatility
Industry Stock Return
Observations
R2

Firm-Level Panel
0.018
(2.61)**
-0.005
(4.19)***
-0.288
(14.92)***
0.0770
(8.99)***
-0.118
(6.51)***
-0.050
(4.78)***
0.008
(6.45)***
-0.481
(8.48)***
-0.436
(10.57)***
0.075
(8.46)***
0.218
(10.97)***
0.187
(12.96)***
0.535
(3.57)***
0.100
(6.15)***
49,527
0.40

EW Industry Panel
0.014
(3.72)***
-0.005
(1.33)
-0.388
(9.99)***
0.135
(3.70)***
-0.080
(3.15)***
-0.071
(4.07)***
0.033
(5.86)***
0.517
(4.03)***
-0.363
(2.67)***
0.1121
(6.22)***
0.398
(3.58)***
0.896
(8.07)***
0.334
(3.44)***
0.067
(0.81)
4,739
0.67
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VW Industry Panel
0.016
(3.86)***
-0.005
(1.39)
-0.381
(9.68)***
0.147
(3.63)***
-0.080
(3.18)***
-0.071
(4.05)***
0.034
(5.91)***
0.515
(4.00)***
-0.382
(2.78)***
0.1126
(6.27)***
0.406
(3.65)***
0.906
(7.80)***
0.343
(3.49)***
0.071
(0.82)
4,739
0.60

TMT Firms Omitted
0.021
(4.17)***
-0.004
(1.82)*
-0.150
(4.84)***
0.204
(3.99)***
-0.110
(2.95)***
-0.021
(0.24)
0.020
(5.09)***
-0.398
(5.12)***
-0.221
(4.05)***
0.5353
(5.69)***
0.108
(1.69)*
0.200
(3.22)***
0.329
(3.74)***
0.041
(1.37)
3,688
0.62

Table VI

Cash and Litigation Risk: Simultaneous Equations
This table reports the estimation results for the following simultaneous equations model:
Insurance Effect : Cash Ratio = γ1 Litigation + θ1 X + β1 X1 + ε1 ,
Enticement Effect : Litigation = γ2 Cash Ratio + θ2 X + β2X2 + ε2 ,
Cash Ratio is the ratio of cash and marketable securities to the book value of total assets for firm i; Litigation
is the probability of litigation for firm i; X1 is leverage, the identifying variable of the first equation, and X2 is
stock turnover, the identifying variable of the second equation. Litigation risk is a dummy variable set equal to
one for firms that are involved in a litigation in the following year and zero otherwise. Year and industry dummy
variables are included in all specifications. The sample period is 1996 to 2006.
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Second Stage
Dependent Variable
Litigation Instrument

Cash Ratio
0.052
(6.24)***

Cash Instrument
Leverage

Cash Flow
Net Working Capital
Dividend Payer
Market-to-Book
Capital Expenditures
Acquisitions
R&D to Sales
Net Debt Issuance
Net Equity Issuance
Industry CF Volatility
Systematic Volatility
Idiosyncratic Volatility

Cash Ratio
0.051
(6.09)***

-1.015
(-1.28)

-0.019
(-4.94)***
-0.014
(-3.81)***
-0.004
(-0.76)
-0.049
(-3.63)***
0.010
(7.79)***
-0.470
(-7.63)***
-0.658
(-9.41)***
0.094
(14.10)***
0.260
(7.07)***
0.205
(11.24)***
0.123
(7.10)***
0.163
(1.05)
-0.079
(-0.37)

Litigation Risk

-0.229
(-10.65)***
2.465
(14.41)***
0.206
(9.76)***
-0.072
(-2.48)**
-0.004
(-0.10)
-0.341
(-3.64)***
0.001
(0.06)
-0.116
(-0.21)
0.096
(0.15)
0.192
(2.44)**
-0.780
(-3.20)***
-0.022
(-0.12)
-0.025
(-0.15)
0.950
(0.71)
10.368
(7.16)***

-0.019
(-4.79)***
-0.014
(-3.80)***
-0.003
(-0.53)
-0.049
(-3.65)***
0.010
(7.82)***
-0.466
(-7.60)***
-0.658
(-9.48)***
0.093
(14.16)***
0.260
(7.13)***
0.205
(11.36)***
0.118
(6.30)***
0.161
(1.04)
-0.086
(-0.40)
0.000
(-0.57)
-0.024
(-1.21)

Unionization Rate
Missing Unionization Dummy

2.457
(14.31)***
0.212
(9.95)***
-0.075
(-2.53)**
0.024
(0.61)
-0.337
(-3.58)***
0.001
(0.12)
-0.151
(-0.28)
-0.080
(-0.12)
0.208
(2.60)***
-0.731
(-2.95)***
0.023
(0.12)
-0.130
(-0.79)
0.955
(0.69)
10.488
(7.18)***
-0.010
(-2.65)***
-0.154
(-1.13)

2,413

0.510
0.195
2,413

2,413
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-1.047
(-1.02)

-0.025
(-2.10)**
-0.010
(0.56)
-0.014
(-0.98)
-0.055
(-1.96)*
0.019
(3.89)***
-0.667
(-3.47)***
-0.619
(-3.52)***
0.083
(1.58)
0.271
(2.30)**
0.142
(1.18)
0.026
(0.61)
3.124
(1.73)*
-0.421
(-0.35)

-0.002
(-0.43)
0.000
(0.25)
0.494

Ownership
0.510

Litigation Risk

-0.231
(-3.23)***

G-Index

Adj. R2
Pseudo R2
N

Cash Ratio
0.048
(3.73)***

-1.022
(-1.14)

-0.231
(-10.73)***

Turnover
ln(Total Assets)

Litigation Risk

0.197
2,413

717

3.079
(7.59)***
0.267
(5.65)***
-0.107
(-1.81)*
0.121
(1.71)
-0.458
(-2.65)***
0.037
(0.86)
-0.045
(-0.56)
-0.721
(-0.10)
0.711
(2.28)**
-1.446
(-2.60)***
0.360
(0.55)
-0.245
(-0.91)
0.907
(0.64)
17.157
(3.30)***

-0.026
(-1.17)
0.006
(0.82)
0.173
717

Table VII

Litigation Risk and Corporate Investment
This table presents the estimation results from the investment regression
Iit = αi + β1 Litigationit + β2 Qi,t−1 + β3CFi,t−1 + γt + εit ,
where Iit is capital expenditures scaled by beginning-of-year net property, plant and equipment, Qi,t−1 is
beginning-of-year Tobin’s Q, and CFi,t−1 is the beginning-of-year cash flow rate. In the first two columns of
the table, the variable Litigationit is a dummy variable set equal to one if a litigation is filed against firm i in year
t, and zero otherwise. In the last column, the litigation dummy is set equal to one if there is a litigation event
involving a peer firm in firm i’s industry, where industry classification is based on four-digit SIC codes. Standard
errors are clustered by firm and the resulting t-statistics are reported in parentheses.

Litigation Dummy
QI,t−1
CFI,t−1
Constant
Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared

Own Firm Litigations
-0.157
-0.127
(8.19)***
(6.82)***
0.034
0.031
(12.40)***
(11.35)***
0.223
0.201
(15.31)***
(13.75)***
0.405
0.293
(59.81)***
(14.93)***
Firm
Firm, Year
49,527
50,887
0.06
0.07
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Peer Firm Litigation
-0.022
(2.86)***
0.036
(13.62)***
0.232
(16.49)***
0.406
(58.27)***
Firm, Year
50,887
0.06

Table VIII

The Effect of Litigation Risk on the Value of Cash
This table presents the results of OLS regressions in which the independent variable is the excess stock return
(the firm’s fiscal year stock return minus the matched Fama and French 5×5 portfolio’s return). All dependent
variables except Leverage, Litigation, Unionization Rate, and Missing Unionization Rate are deflated by the
lagged market value of equity. Cash Holdings is cash plus marketable securities, Litigation is the in-sample
predicted probability from the probit model reported in Table VIII, Earnings is earnings before extraordinary
items plus interest, deferred tax credits, and investment tax credits, and Net Assets is total assets minus cash
holdings. Dividends are measured as common dividends paid, and Net Financing is the total equity issuance
minus repurchases plus debt issuance minus debt redemption. R&D Expenses are s et to zero if missing and
Repurchases is defined as the percentage of distributions to shareholders that occur in the form of repurchases.
∆X is compact notation for the 1-year change, Xt − Xt−1 . The subscript t − 1 means the value of the variable
is at the end of fiscal year t − 1. The second and third regressions are only on the subset of firms with positive
payout in the corresponding fiscal year. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and t-statistics are reported
in parentheses.

∆ Cash Holdings
Litigation
Litigation ×∆ Cash Holdings
∆ Earnings
∆ Net Assets
∆ R&D Expenses
∆ Interest Expense
∆ Dividends
Cash Holdingst−1
Market Leverage
Net Financing
Cash Holdingst−1 × ∆ Cash Holdings
Leverage ×∆ Cash Holdings

(1)
1.246
(13.46)***
-2.074
(-18.83)***
-1.146
(-2.31)**
0.272
(4.68)***
0.088
(3.44)***
-0.516
(-1.06)
-0.904
(-3.89)***
1.152
(1.31)
0.155
(7.30)***
-0.868
(-15.10)***
-0.042
(-2.67)***
-0.084
(-2.43)**
-1.667
(-5.93)***

Unionization Rate
Unionization Rate ×∆ Cash Holdings
Missing Unionization Rate

(2)
1.198
(12.29)***
-2.078
(-18.40)***
-1.293
(-2.42)**
0.271
(4.68)***
0.087
(3.43)***
-0.517
(-1.07)
-0.902
(-3.89)***
1.147
(1.30)
0.155
(7.22)***
-0.876
(-15.21)***
-0.042
(-2.70)***
-0.085
(-2.42)**
-1.642
(-5.67)***
0.001
(0.26)
-0.002
(-0.33)
-0.035
(-1.18)

G-Index
G-Index ×∆ Cash Holdings
N
Adjusted R2

12,656
0.17
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12,656
0.17

(3)
1.267
(6.73)***
-1.870
(-17.26)***
-0.973
(-1.79)*
0.384
(7.42)***
0.086
(3.61)***
-0.932
(-1.96)*
-1.325
(-6.41)***
1.465
(1.56)
0.148
(7.18)***
-0.722
(-11.96)***
-0.035
(-2.31)**
-0.061
(-2.44)**
-1.271
(-4.53)***

-0.002
(-0.73)
-0.045
(-2.72)***
11,195
0.15

DATA APPENDIX
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Variable
ln(Total Assets)
Leverage
Cash Flow
Net Working Capital
Dividend Payer
Market-to-Book
Capital Expenditures
Acquisitions
R&D to Sales
Net Debt Issuance
Net Equity Issuance
Industry CF Volatility
Litigation Dummy
Litigation Risk Dummy
Unionization Rate
Missing Unionization Dummy

Definition
Natural logarithm of the book value of assets in 1994 dollars
(Long-term debt+short-term debt)/book value of assets.
Earnings after interest, dividends, and taxes, and before depreciation, divided by net assets
Net working capital minus cash, divided by assets
Indicator set equal to one in years in which a firm pays dividends
Ratio of the market value to the book value of a firm’s assets
Capital expenditures divided by assets
Acquisition expenditures divided by assets
Research and Development expenses divided by sales; set to zero if missing
Debt issuance minus debt retirement divided by assets
Equity sales minus equity purchases divided by assets
2-SIC code industry average of firms’ cash flow standard deviations for the previous 20 years
Set equal to one when firms are involved in a class action lawsuits in the same year.
The dummy mantains the same value also in the two years following the litigation
Set equal to one when firms are involved in a class action lawsuits in the following year
Fraction of workers in a 3-digit CIC industry that are represented by unions
Set equal to one when unionization rate data is missing

Stock Turnover

[1 − ∏ (1-volume tradedt /total sharest )], for the one-year period preceding the lawsuit filing

Source
Compustat
Compustat
Compustat
Compustat
Compustat
Compustat
Compustat
Compustat
Compustat
Compustat
Compustat
Compustat
SCAC*
SCAC
www.unionstats.com
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CRSP

t=1

Industry Stock Return
Cash Holdings
Repurchases
Earnings
Net Assets
R&D Expenses
Net Financing
Dividends
Market Leverage
Idiosyncratic Risk
Systematic Risk

Value weighted average industry returns for the year preceding the litigation filing
Cash plus marketable securities
Percentage of distributions to shareholders that occur in the form of repurchases
Earnings before extraordinary items plus interest
Total assets minus cash holdings
Research and Development expenses; set to zero if missing
Total equity issuance minus repurchases plus debt issuance minus debt redemption
Common dividends paid
Total debt divided by total debt plus the market value of equity
Measured as the standard deviation of residuals from a regression of excess daily returns on the market factor
Standard deviation of predicted values from regression of excess daily returns on the market factor

*Securities Class Action Clearinghouse

CRSP
Compustat
Compustat
Compustat
Compustat
Compustat
Compustat
Compustat
Compustat
CRSP
CRSP

